The COVID-19 Pandemic: what worked, what didn't, and potential plans moving forward

Following the peak of the coronavirus pandemic, many start to look back on events and decisions that took place to analyze what truly happened and whether or not the best course of action was taken. To this end, there have been numerous countries, states, and even individuals who have come under fire for their actions amidst this pandemic. However, there have also been many instances of groups or individuals being praised for their decisions that ultimately saved people's lives and livelihoods. Considering this, in this essay, I seek to draw a line between the successful and not-so-successful practices that were implemented while also highlighting a critical variable that influenced the crisis as a whole. Furthermore, In doing so, we will be able to pinpoint what actions should be taken to mitigate damage in future crises that resemble the coronavirus pandemic.

We'll start by discussing an example of a coronavirus success story to highlight what facilitated the best results during the Covid-19 crisis. Regarding this, one of the countries that did the best job "flattening the curve and reducing the spread of the virus" was New Zealand (Jamieson). As of June 11th 2020, "New Zealand had a total of 1,504 cases of the virus," 1,154 of them being confirmed cases, and only 22 total deaths (Jamieson). Furthermore, they were largely able to protect their economic sector despite the difficulty that many other countries faced dealing with this amidst the pandemic. Considering these figures, what exactly did New Zealand do that was so effective at containing the coronavirus?

Firstly, one of the main factors in stopping the spread was New Zealand's decision to quickly and efficiently engage in various isolation tactics in the early stages of Covid. Starting as early as February of 2020, "foreign nationals were prevented from traveling from mainland China," and eventually this was "extended to cover travelers from Iran, northern Italy, and South Korea" as cases became more prevalent (Jamieson). Subsequently, New Zealand eventually made a highly criticized decision to close its borders to everyone except "New Zealand citizens and permanent residents" (Jamieson). Doing so helped reduce the opportunities for the virus to spread, but eventually, New Zealand decided to take an extra step and impose a short lockdown period that, while originally meant to be 4 weeks, lasted from March 26th until April 27th. This allowed the country to more efficiently drop from level 4 to level 3 on their four-level alert system, four being the worst case and one being the best case, and even resulted in reaching level 2 by May 14th. While all of these decisions played an important role in reducing the spread of the virus itself, New Zealand also took measures specifically targeted at protecting specific groups and the economy.

Regarding these measures, the main one was a $NZ12.1 billion recovery package, which eventually grew over time to $NZ52 billion, meant to support the country amidst all the difficulties that treating the virus and managing the lockdown had to offer. In terms of how specific groups of people were supported, this bill included funds for wage subsidies which helped non-essential workers to continue social distancing despite being unable to work. Furthermore, it specifically allocated "support for vulnerable populations," embodying their prime minister's goal to "go hard, and go early" when it came to protecting the health of New Zealanders that were most in danger (Jamieson). Regarding the economy, the bill also included "financial guarantees for small and medium-sized businesses" and "leave and self-isolation support" (Jamieson). These financial guarantees supported businesses during the lockdowns and the pandemic in general since they acted as a promise from the government to pay off any debt incurred as a result of the two. Also, getting paid leave and support during self-isolation, when one isolates themselves after coming into contact with the virus, was a major factor because it incentivized keeping workplaces safe. Specifically, people knew they would still be supported if they got sick, which prevented cases of people coming to work with the virus and ultimately creating stricter rules that would inhibit business.

Considering all the effective practices that New Zealand had created, one might question why we don't say to emulate New Zealand and be done with it. To this end, there are a variety of factors that highlight why we need to learn from New Zealand, but not try to be just like them. First off, New Zealand benefited from many different advantages "such as geographical isolation, a civil political environment, and strong central government" (Jamieson). When we look at some of the worst-case scenarios, we notice places like New York which lacked all of these advantages and thus had "over 30,000 cases, roughly 6.6 % of the global total" (Gross). Furthermore, New York also engaged in many of the practices that New Zealand did, such as having lockdowns and eventually a stimulus package, but still suffered on a much larger scale along with other countries like the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom, in particular, has participated in numerous lockdowns yet has still suffered from increasing infection rates and a dwindling economy to the point where scholars like Angus Dalgleish, a professor at St. George's, University of London, have spoken against lockdowns saying they are "a killer, worse than Covid-19 could ever be" (Dalgleish). At this point, it seems like, while there are success stories, there aren't any examples of success stories whose practices can be used in other countries around the world. Fortunately, there are places we can learn from like Florida where they made progress despite not having any of the advantages that New Zealand benefitted from.

Specifically, when we look at Florida, we don't see many of the negative trends that other U.S. states like New York and California have experienced. Despite having a population where 20% of citizens are 65 or older, "an age group that is twice as likely to develop serious illness from the virus", Florida had "a lower death toll per capita than 26 other states" (Stern). Furthermore, Florida also participated in a lockdown similar to those of New York and California, yet they were not plagued by the same detriments. Regarding the economic sector, Florida touted an unemployment rate that was only 6.1% this past December, a figure almost a third of the size of the unemployment rate of New York at the time. Not to mention, Florida was one of the few states that "experienced steady population growth" during the pandemic, gaining around a thousand new residents every single day. Once again, we need to focus on what tactics Florida chose to implement in order to protect both the people and the economy.

Starting with how Florida defended against the virus itself, one important decision they made was placing a major focus on "protecting older and vulnerable populations" (Rivkees). Specifically, Florida recognized that older demographics were most at risk and took numerous precautions to make sure that they were protected. First, they implemented "enhanced hygienic measures" like "screening all staff members and visitors for illness" at nursing homes and assisted living facilities, unlike some states like New York (Rivkees). While this alone helped reduce opportunities for the virus to spread in high-risk areas, Florida also mobilized some emergency medical teams that went to "more than 4000 nursing homes and assisted living facilities" to educate people on "best practices in COVID-19 infection control" (Rivkees). These actions proved highly effective since, as of March 2020, testing of around 300 nursing home/ assisted living facility workers resulted in an extremely low 1% Covid-19 positivity rate. Another factor that contributed to Florida's success was their fast and efficient preparation of hospitals, similar to the go-hard, go-early plan of New Zealand. They made sure to train "staff members in infection control measures and the proper use of [personal protective equipment]," and also "continuously monitored hospital bed capacity using the Emergency Status System" (Rivkees). While all these decisions had a profound effect on limiting the spread of the coronavirus, Florida also made many decisions to safeguard the economy.

The biggest factor in Florida being able to protect its economy was its effective planning of lockdown periods and business restrictions. Specifically, unlike places like Michigan and the United Kingdom that engaged in long and sometimes numerous lockdowns, Florida chose to play things by ear and only participated in one 30 day lockdown during the spring of 2020. However, while they chose to remain in lockdown when "experts knew relatively little about" the virus, Florida "removed all its restrictions on businesses" once preventative practices like social distancing and mask use emerged (Stern). This balancing of lockdowns and restrictions allowed Florida to minimize the spread of the virus while avoiding causing significant damage to businesses in the process. Although mentioned previously, a major factor in allowing Florida to open its businesses was its goal to "protect vulnerable populations" (Stern). If Governor Desantis had not gone to such great lengths to protect the senior populations that were most at risk, then the opening of the economy may not have been as safe and effective as it was.

Having looked at New Zealand, Florida, and various other governments' situations during the recent pandemic, next it's essential that we discuss an important factor that has affected the crisis as a whole to better understand how solutions should be tailored. Specifically, I'm referring to the media, and, in particular, how their coverage of events in various parts of the globe has ultimately worsened the crisis for many countries. To begin, we'll look at a study in Germany that sought to identify what effect Covid-19 related media was having on citizens throughout the country. After conducting a survey with around 6233 people, they discovered that there was a connection between "Covid-19 related media exposure" and "psychological strain" (Bendau). Specifically, they found that "the frequency and the duration of COVID-19 related media exposure" were positively correlated to "topic-induced stress" (Bendau). Furthermore, social media was also found to have a noticeable effect on anxiety and depression. A study by Junling Gao sampled from 4827 participants and found that 48.3% experienced depression as a result of social media during the pandemic, and another 22.6% experienced anxiety. While it may seem like a given that receiving news on a pandemic-like situation will cause stress, this effect that the media has on individuals can have a profound influence on the policies and plans that governments implement to deal with the virus.

To explain, a study on Covid-19 information exposure in Ethiopia highlights how being exposed to large amounts of media "may lead people to overestimate the risk of COVID-19" (Tamiru). Furthermore, it highlights how this is often accompanied by increased "fear and worry about the disease" (Tamiru). Keeping this in mind, what policy would we expect people who believe that the coronavirus is deadlier than most common colds to support? Of course, we would expect them to support more blunt force methods of containing a disease like the lockdowns we saw in New York and the United Kingdom. However, as we now know, many of these longer-term lockdowns like the ones occurring in New York have largely failed compared to the more short-term policies adopted by governor Desantis of Florida. Regarding the point that I'm getting at, the media's coverage of events has been a major factor in building support for these long-term lockdowns, and thus the media shares some blame in the outcome of the pandemic since these lockdowns mostly failed.

Having gone over some cases of successes and failures amidst the pandemic, along with what I believe to be an important factor influencing the crisis altogether, now we can identify some potential solutions that could be applied to future Covid-like crises. Regarding what we learned from New Zealand, it is clear that using isolation tactics like closing borders and preventing travel to certain high-risk locations are viable means of reducing the spread of any virus. Furthermore, New Zealand also highlighted the significance of creating safe work environments when it comes to protecting a countries economy. Specifically, policies that support wage subsidies and financial guarantees for businesses can be a great way to help future economies hold out against the reduced business opportunities and increased business restrictions that pandemics often bring about. However, as shown through our discussion of places like New York and Florida, some practices that work in New Zealand, which benefits from a variety of different advantages that we've discussed, don't work as well when applied in a different scenario.

New York, in particular, participated in lockdowns similar to that of New Zealand but still became a major epicenter for the pandemic. However, Florida does show us that there are some options that places without the benefits New Zealand has can utilize to mitigate damage during a covid-like crisis. First, every government should focus on managing the duration of lockdowns the way Florida did. They made sure that the state was locked down when a bunch of unknowns were up in the air, but loosened restrictions as safety practices and facts about the virus became more clear. Furthermore, Florida was able to achieve this because of its implementation of enhanced hygienic measures like screening of nursing home employees and the mobilization of emergency medical teams to inform people of infection control practices. These decisions put an emphasis on protecting those vulnerable to the virus, older populations, and highlights how future pandemic control plans should do the same. If Florida had not made a goal of protecting those vulnerable to Covid-19, then their plans to open the economy would have likely caused much greater damage. While Floridas strategies can be applied to address some of the problems that arise when a country doesn't have the benefits New Zealand has, they do not target the issue of the media during the pandemic.

Specifically, the media has had a substantial impact on how people view the coronavirus, which has had an indirect effect on the policies that many governments have implemented. In particular, this has been done to boost policies like long-term lockdowns in various states and Countries that have proven to be ineffective in many cases. Considering this, countries should focus on putting more funding into government media or informational hubs(websites/online journals) to try and establish a more fact-oriented informational network. This method would focus media more on identifying statistics and would also help limit misinformation. Furthermore, there would be fewer cases like New York where the Office of the Attorney General found that "nursing home resident deaths [appeared] to be undercounted" by around 50% (Notable & quotable).

Ultimately, it is clear that solutions targeting covid like crises will need to be multilayered in order to have a considerable effect. Specifically, countries will need to establish whether they have the necessary advantages to utilize the practices of New Zealand, and if not, must adjust to be more like Florida. Not to mention, governments also need to focus on Media and must limit the damage it causes to people's mental health. Combining all these factors, while not a definite answer, serve as means to mitigate damage in future pandemics.

Works Cited

Bendau, A., Petzold, M. B., Pyrkosch, L., Mascarell Maricic, L., Betzler, F., Rogoll, J., . . . Plag, J. (2020). Associations between covid-19 related media consumption and symptoms of anxiety, depression and covid-19 related fear in the general population in germany. European Archives of Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience, doi:http://dx.doi.org.libproxy2.usc.edu/10.1007/s00406-020-01171-6

Dalgleish, A. (2020, Nov 02). LOCKDOWN'S A KILLER... WORSE THAN COVID COULD EVER BE. Daily Mail Retrieved from http://libproxy.usc.edu/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.libproxy2.usc.edu/newspapers/lockdowns-killer-worse-than-covid-could-ever-be/docview/2456340739/se-2?accountid=14749

Gao, J., Zheng, P., Jia, Y., Chen, H., Mao, Y., Chen, S., . . . Dai, J. (2020). Mental health problems and social media exposure during COVID-19 outbreak. PLoS ONE, 15(4), 10. doi:http://dx.doi.org.libproxy2.usc.edu/10.1371/journal.pone.0231924

Gross, S. A., Robbins, D. H., Greenwald, D. A., Schnoll-Sussman, F., & Pochapin, M. B. (2020). Preparation in the big apple: New york city, a new epicenter of the COVID-19 pandemic. The American Journal of Gastroenterology, 115(6), 801-804. doi:http://dx.doi.org.libproxy2.usc.edu/10.14309/ajg.0000000000000636

Jamieson, T. (2020). “Go hard, go early”: Preliminary lessons from new Zealand’s response to COVID-19. American Review of Public Administration, 50(6-7), 598-605. doi:http://dx.doi.org.libproxy2.usc.edu/10.1177/0275074020941721

Notable & quotable: Covid death in new york nursing homes; 'A larger number of nursing home residents died from COVID-19 than the new york state department of health's (DOH) published nursing home data reflected.'. (2021, Jan 31). Wall Street Journal (Online) Retrieved from http://libproxy.usc.edu/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.libproxy2.usc.edu/newspapers/notable-amp-quotable-covid-death-new-york-nursing/docview/2484132869/se-2?accountid=14749

Rivkees Scott, A., & Shamarial, R. (2020). The florida department of health STEPS public health approach: The COVID-19 response plan and outcomes through may 31, 2020. Public Health Reports, 135(5), 560-564. doi:http://dx.doi.org.libproxy2.usc.edu/10.1177/0033354920946785

Stern, E. (2021, Feb 23). What we can learn from florida's COVID-19 response. University Wire Retrieved from http://libproxy.usc.edu/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.libproxy2.usc.edu/wire-feeds/what-we-can-learn-floridas-covid-19-response/docview/2495390455/se-2?accountid=14749

Tamiru, A. T., Bayew, K. R., Eden, B. T., Zelalem, N. A., Mehari, W. M., Atalay, G. M., . . . Alemayehu, M. (2020). Community level of COVID-19 information exposure and influencing factors in northwest ethiopia. Risk Management and Healthcare Policy, 13, 2635-2644. doi:http://dx.doi.org.libproxy2.usc.edu/10.2147/RMHP.S280346